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The present monograph extends the available surveys of philosophical inter-
pretations of probability (the treatise [320] by I. Saxl, the book [120] by D. Gillies
and other papers cited in the references) by a look into the Czech lands. In this
respect, it also supplements the book [225] by K. Mačák, which describes the
development of probability theory in this region before 1938.
Recall that although most mathematicians agree with the axiomatic defi-
nition of probability in the sense of Kolmogorov’s foundations presented in his
Grundbegriffe der Wahrscheinlichkeitsrechnung [196], a disagreement concer-
ning the most convenient interpretation of this concept still prevails. Usually,
two groups of interpretations are distinguished: epistemic or personal inter-
pretations that associate probability with the knowledge or belief of human
beings, and objective interpretations that consider probabilities to be human-
independent features of the objective material world. The domain of epistemic
interpretations covers the so-called logical and subjective theories. The first
one identifies probability with a degree of rational belief in a hypothesis or
a prediction; given the same evidence, all rational human beings would en-
tertain the same probability. This conception goes back to G. W. Leibniz and
B. Bolzano with his extensive workWissenschaftslehre [B10], where probability
theory is explicitly developed as an extension of deductive logic and an integral
part of the entire logical theory. From other representatives of this conception,
let us mention J. von Kries, W. E. Johnson, J. M. Keynes, L. Wittgenstein,
F. Waismann (see e.g. their works [199], [178], [193], [390] and [383], respecti-
vely). The subjective interpretation identifies probability with the degree of
belief of a given individual in the occurrence of some event or in the validity of
some hypothesis. W. F. Donkin, B. de Finetti, F. P. Ramsey and L. J. Savage
are amongst its most famous proponents (see [297], [98]–[101] and [317]). Two
principal objective interpretations are frequency theory that defines the proba-
bility of an outcome as the limiting frequency with which it appears in a long
series of similar events, and the propensity theory that takes probability to be
a propensity inherent in a set of repeatable conditions. The former is connected
mainly with R. L. Ellis, J. Venn, G. T. Fechner, G. F. Helm, H. Bruns and,
above all, R. von Mises (see [87], [380], [93], [141], [47] and [241]–[243]); the
latter was introduced by K. Popper (see [292]).
The first chapter of this book recounts the development of the definition
of probability from the 17th to the 20th centuries. It also presents a survey
of the main interpretations of this concept and points out their importance
for motivating students to study probability in school curriculums. Special
attention is paid to the subjective interpretation that deals with real concepts,
with a subjective acceptance or rejection of hypothesis, and thus corresponds
to everyday considerations. Czech textbooks from the 19th century are also
discussed; in most of them, applications of probability theory, especially in the
field of insurance and betting, were highlighted. Further chapters are devoted
to the contributions of particular personalities to probability theory with the
emphasis on interpretations.
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The first is Bernard Bolzano (1781–1848), the pioneer of logical conception.
In order to defend the Holy Scripture, he incorporated probability calculus
into a religious textbook Lehrbuch der Religionswissenschaft [B8] published in
1834. From a mathematical point of view, the above-mentioned treatise Wis-
senschaftslehre [B10], where Bolzano builds probability theory as an extension
of deductive logic, might be more interesting. He defines the probability or the
relative validity of a proposition M with respect to propositions A, B, C, . . .
and variables i, j, k, . . . as the ratio of the number of cases in which all the
propositions A, B, C, . . . as well asM are true to the number of cases in which
only the propositions A, B, C, . . . are all true. In other words, Bolzano’s pro-
bability expresses the degree of justification of the hypothesis M on the basis
of the evidence E = A ∧ B ∧ C ∧ . . . . If we denote with m(X) the measure
for the set of the variables for which a proposition X is true, we can write
P (M |E) = m(M ∧E)/m(E) .
Many of Bolzano’s ideas contained in [B10] were spread thanks to the first
edition of the textbook of philosophical propaedeutic for grammar schools [401],
published in 1853 by Bolzano’s former student R. Zimmermann.42 Towards the
end of the 19th and beginning of the 20th centuries, [B10] was appreciated by
F. Brentano and his pupils, especially B. Kerry, E. Husserl, K. Twardowski and
his student J. 
Lukasiewicz (see [192], [158], [377] and [219], respectively). Later
it was held in high regard by the representatives of logical empiricism. Bol-
zano’s contribution to probability theory was cited, for example, by P. Frank,
F. Waismann and W. Dubislav at the First Conference on the Epistemology of
Exact Sciences, which took place in Prague in 1929. Their contributions were
published in the first volume of Erkenntnis, a publication series of the Vienna
Circle whose program declaration was read for the first time at the Prague
conference. In the introduction to the Stuttgart edition of Wissenschaftslehre,
J. Berg compared the theories of Bolzano, Wittgenstein and Carnap and highly
appreciated Bolzano’s contribution by designating him the first philosopher
who drew up the concept of inductive probability.
The third chapter of the book concerns another proponent of the logical con-
ception of probability, Tomáš Garrigue Masaryk (1850–1937). For his inaugural
lecture at Charles-Ferdinand University in Prague, Masaryk chose the theme
Probability Calculus and Hume’s Scepticism; he developed the topic further in
the Czech treatise [M3] and in its shortened German variation [M6]. Although
all of Masaryk’s other publications were devoted to philosophy, sociology and
later politics, and, although the character of the mentioned treatises was prima-
rily philosophical, it is remarkable that they display Masaryk’s wide acquain-
tance with the development of probability theory, especially in the connection
with inductive logic. The cited treatises were conceived as an answer to Hume’s
ideas formulated in his Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding [150], espe-
cially to the idea that inductive inferences are solely based on habits, and since
the concept of causal connection does not correspond to any impression of the
42On the recommendation of Bolzano himself, Zimmermann did not explicitly cite his
name, since his treatises were on the Index Librorum Prohibitorum.
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external or internal experience, it is completely blank. Masaryk characterises
the principle of Hume’s scepticism with the following: Only mathematics deser-
ves our confidence, empirical sciences are uncertain, since the recognition of cau-
sal connections of facts evades us; because we can gain reliable knowledge only on
the basis of an evident relation between the cause and an effect ([M3], p. 24).
Masaryk describes the history of philosophical attempts to disprove Hume’s
scepticism, and he finds all of them insufficient. He starts with the ideas of philo-
sophers of the Scottish School, T. Reid, J. Beattie and J. Oswald, and then he
comes to I. Kant and F. E. Beneke. He continues with the first attempts to dis-
prove Hume’s scepticism with the help of probability theory, namely the contri-
butions of J. G. Sulzer, M. Mendelssohn, J. M. de Gérando, S.-F. Lacroix and
S. D. Poisson. Then he turns to inductive logic and its history. He discusses the
work of G. W. Leibniz, J. Bernoulli, P. S. Laplace, A. Quetelet, R. Herschel,
J. Venn etc. He concludes with the remark: All these recent contributions lack
an explicit relation to Hume; hereby they lack, I would say, the real point ([M3],
p. 14). It seems that Masaryk did not know the relevant treatises of B. Bolzano
yet: in [B8] Hume is explicitly cited, in [B10] Bolzano systematically builds
inductive logic as the extension of deductive logic, based on probability theory.
The next chapter deals with the contribution of the Czech priest and mathe-
matician Václav Šimerka (1819–1887), who can be classed as an advocate of
subjective theory. In the remarkable treatise, Power of Conviction [Š11], he
thoroughly investigated the numerical expression of the strength of conviction
by probability. Let us briefly remark that to assemble more convictions to-
gether, Šimerka introduces the concept of an imperfection of a conviction as
a difference between complete knowledge and the given conviction v. Consider
convictions v, v′, v′′, . . . and the corresponding imperfections. The resulting
power of conviction V is given by the formula 1−V = (1−v)(1−v′)(1−v′′) . . . ,
which can be expressed as follows: the imperfection of a human conviction is
a product of imperfections of its grounds. For v = v′ = v′′ = · · · = 0 we have
V = 0; according to Šimerka’s words: empty grounds provide no belief. For
v′ = v′′ = · · · = 0 we obtain V = v and the characterisation: in an empty
mind every ground enroots with its full power. Šimerka’s paper was apprecia-
ted by Masaryk, but even though it was published also in German (see [Š12]),
it remained without any substantial influence on the later development of the
subjective interpretation of probability.
Philosophical interpretations, including the contributions of Masaryk and
Šimerka were criticised by Karel Vorovka (1879–1929), to whom the fourth
chapter is dedicated. Vorovka was mainly interested in philosophy and the phi-
losophical problems of mathematics. With respect to the topic of this book are
especially interesting his papers Philosophical Reach of Probability Theory [V5]
and On Probability of Causes [V7], where he criticised the efforts of basing the
theory of logical induction on probability theory, challenged the caution when
using probability theory in real situations and insisted that it cannot solve the
problem of causality; he stressed that the concept of cause and effect should
be replaced by the concept of correlation. Vorovka also clarified the most sub-
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stantial problem of logical interpretation, namely, the determination of prior
probabilities in Bayes’ formula for the probability of certain hypothesis, con-
ditioned by available evidence. Unlike Masaryk, Vorovka claims that Hume’s
objections are justified and they cannot be disproved by probability theory. He
insists that probability calculus and Hume’s scepticism belong to completely
different intellectual areas and it is not possible to bring them into a ratio-
nal relation. He compares the application of probability calculus to Hume’s
scepticism as to cutting an atom with a knife and the introduction of Hume’s
scepticism into probability calculus as to sharpening the atoms in the knife.
A separate chapter is devoted to geometric probability which played an impor-
tant role for extending the classical definition and introducing the concept of a set
and measure to probability theory. Recall that when we pass from the investigation
of properties of finite populations to the geometric properties (e.g., volume, area,
length, shape) of geometrically describable objects (e.g., human beings and
their organs and blood vessels, animals, plants, cells in a tissue, rivers, rocks
etc.), replacing random population samples by probes of a lower dimension
(sections or microscope images, linear or point probes), and instead of ”classi-
cal” probability we base our inferences on geometric probability, then we pass
from statistics to the domain of stereology. Since we are not only surrounded,
but even formed, by such structures, stereology and hence also geometric pro-
bability are of great importance to our lives and represent a substantial tool
for exploring and understanding the world around us. The text calls to mind
the origins of geometric probability and then the contributions of E. Czuber,
B. Hostinský and J. Baťa are discussed in more detail.
The personality of Emanuel Czuber (1851–1925) is the subject of the next
chapter. He discussed the problem of the foundations of probability theory
and other philosophical questions in various works – e.g., in a monograph on
geometric probability [C23], in a textbook of probability theory and statis-
tics [C37], treatises [C32], [C34], [C38], [C41] and [C42] and in the monograph
Die philosophischen Grundlagen der Wahrscheinlichkeitsrechnung [C51], solely
devoted to the philosophical foundations of probability theory. He admitted
various approaches as meaningful and profitable in different situations. For
repeated events, he considered the frequency approach useful; for unique unre-
peatable events, he preferred the logical theory. He also emphasised the great
importance of probability theory for epistemology and natural philosophy.
The final chapter is devoted to Otomar Pankraz (1903–1976), who pu-
blished two papers ([P28] and [P31] with the supplement [P32]) dealing with
the foundations of probability theory. Here he discussed Kolmogorov’s axioms
and argued that the fundamental concept of probability theory should be rather
a conditional probability. He provided its axiomatic definition and studied its
properties and various interpretations, including frequency and logical inter-
pretations. These treatises remained practically unknown up to the present
time; independently of them, similar axiomatic definitions were proposed in
the 1950’s by A. Rényi and K. Popper (see [300]–[304] and [291]–[292]).
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